Bava Basra 27b ~ The Roots of a Palm Tree

בבא בתרא כז ,ב

אמר עולא אילן הסמוך למצר בתוך שש עשרה אמה גזלן הוא ואין מביאין ממנו בכורים עשרה אמה... ותו לא והא תנן מרחיקין את האילן מן הבור כ"ה אמה אמר אביי מיזל טובא אזלי אכחושי לא מכחשי אלא עד שש עשרה אמה טפי לא מכחשי

Ulla said: An individual who owns a tree that is within sixteen cubits of a boundary is a robber, [since it draws nourishment from the neighbor’s land,] and one does not bring first fruits from it, [since that would be a mitzva that is fulfilled by means of a transgression]... But do roots extend sixteen cubits and no more? Didn’t we learn in a Mishnah (25b): One must distance a tree twenty-five cubits from a cistern? [This indicates that tree roots reach more than sixteen cubits.] Abaye said: The roots extend farther, but they drain the earth of nutrients within sixteen cubits; with regard to an area any more distant than that, they do not drain the earth.

The Root Systems of the Date Palm Tree

While the Talmud doesn't specify the kind of tree that must be distanced from others, in Mesepotamia the most likely candidate was the Date Palm, Phoenix dactylifera. These trees grow to a height of 75 feet, and you've seen plenty of them if you've driven south towards Eilat.  Here is their root system:

USDA image from Chao. C, Krueger R. The Date Palm (Phoenix dactylifera L.): Overview of Biology, Uses, and Cultivation. Hort. Science 2007 42(5); 1077-1082.

To whom shall we turn to get information about the size of that root system? The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, of course.  According to a helpful document by a member of their Date Production Support Programme, "Roots are found as far as 25m from the palm and deeper than 6m, but 85 percent of the roots are distributed in the zone of 2 m deep and 2m on both lateral sides in a deep loamy soil." But the 25m (82 foot) roots are an extreme. Most of the roots extend about 10m (about 32 feet).

Table from here.

It would appear that Abaye was referring to the average reach of the zone II roots. Assuming that a talmudic amah is between 48-57cm, Abaye's figure would put the zone II distance of at 7.6-9.1 m. That's right in keeping with the 10m average figure from the UN document.  Good to know that on these important matters, the UN and the Jewish People are in agreement.

Image from here.

Bava Basra 24a ~The Chatam Sofer, Rationalism, and Anatomy That Isn't There & Bava Basra 25b ~ The Sun's Orbit Around the Earth

Here are two posts, one for today’s daf, and one for tomorrow’s. Enjoy, and Shabbat Shalom from Talmudology

אַחֵינוּ כָּל בֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל

הַנְּתוּנִים בַּצָּרָה וּבַשִּׁבְיָה

הָעוֹמְדִים בֵּין בַּיָּם וּבֵין בַּיַּבָּשָׁה

הַמָּקוֹם יְרַחֵם עֲלֵיהֶם

וְיוֹצִיאֵם מִצָּרָה לִרְוָחָה

וּמֵאֲפֵלָה לְאוֹרָה

וּמִשִּׁעְבּוּד לִגְאֻלָּה

הָשָׁתָא בַּעֲגָלָא וּבִזְמַן קָרִיב

---

Bava Basra 24a ~The Chatam Sofer, Rationalism,

and Anatomy That Isn't There

In August 2013 a paper published in the otherwise sleepy Journal of Anatomy caused quite a sensation. Although doctors have been dissecting the human body for centuries, it seems that they missed a bit, and a team from Belgium announced that they had discovered a new knee ligament, which they called the anterolateral ligament. On today’s page of Talmud the rabbis describes the opposite phenomena. In it, the rabbis describe an anatomical part that is really hard to identify, and may not exist at all.  It is called the aliyah, which usually refers to an attic or the upper chamber of a house.

PROXIMITY or Majority?

The rabbis are trying to resolve the issue of who owns a dove found between two dove cots. How far could it hop, and what difference might that make with regards the decision?

בבא בתרא כג, ב

ניפול הנמצא בתוך חמשים אמה הרי הוא של בעל השובך חוץ מחמשים אמה הרי הוא של מוצאו נמצא בין שני שובכות קרוב לזה שלו קרוב לזה שלו מחצה על מחצה שניהם יחלוקו

With regard to a dove chick [nippul] that was found within fifty cubits of a dovecote, it belongs to the owner of the dovecote.If it was found beyond fifty cubits from a dovecote, it belongs to its finder.In a case where it was found between two dovecotes, if it was close to this one, it belongs to the owner of this dovecote; if it was close to that one, it belongs to the owner of that dovecote. If it was half and half, [i.e., equidistant from the two dovecotes,] the two owners divide the value of the chick.

Fair enough. But Abbaye, the great fourth century Babylonian sage had a different take. Perhaps we should not be concerned with proximity, but instead be concerned with who owns the majority of the doves in the area. And brings a proof that will surprise you.

אמר אביי אף אנן נמי תנינא דם שנמצא בפרוזדור ספיקו טמא שחזקתו מן המקור ואע"ג דאיכא עלייה דמקרבא

Abaye said: We learn in a Mishnah (Niddah 17b) as well that one follows the majority rather than proximity: With regard to blood that is found in the corridor [baperozdor],i.e., the cervical canal, and it is uncertain whether or not it is menstrual blood, it is ritually impure as menstrual blood, as there is a presumption that it came from the uterus, which is the source of menstrual blood. [And this is the halakha even though there is an upper chamber, which empties into the canal, which is closer.]

Here is that Mishnah in full:

נדה יז, ב

משל משלו חכמים באשה החדר והפרוזדור והעלייה דם החדר טמא דם העלייה טהור נמצא בפרוזדור ספקו טמא לפי שחזקתו מן המקור

The Sages had a parable with regard to the structure of the sexual organs of a woman [based on the structure of a house]: The inner room represents the uterus, and the corridor [perozdor] leading to the inner room represents the vaginal canal, and the upper story represents the bladder. 

Blood from the inner room is ritually impure. Blood from the upper story is ritually pure. If blood was found in the corridor, there is uncertainty whether it came from the uterus and is impure, or from the bladder and is pure. Despite its state of uncertainty ,it is deemed definitely impure, due to the fact that its presumptive status is of blood that came from the source ,i.e., the uterus, and not from the bladder. 

What anatomy is being discussed here? In particular, what is the aliyah, the “attic” of female genital anatomy? It turns out to be complicated.

the Aliyah surrounds the ovaries

From the Mishanh in Niddah, it is clear that the aliyah sometimes bleeds, and that this blood becomes visible when it passes into the vagina. Maimonides identifies the aliyah with the space that contains the ovaries and the fallopian tubes. In modern medicine the ovaries and the Fallopian tubes and tissues that support them are called the adenxa. They are further from the vagina that the uterus, and so this identification does not fit in with Abaye's anatomy in which the aliyah is closer to the vagina than is the uterus.

רמב׳ם הל׳ איסורי ביאה ה, ד

ולמעלה מן החדר ומן הפרוזדוד, בין חדר לפרוזדוד, והוא המקום שיש בו שתי ביצים של אישה, והשבילים שבהן מתבשלת שכבת זרע שלה--מקום זה הוא הנקרא עלייה.  וכמו נקב פתוח מן העלייה לגג הפרוזדוד, ונקב זה קוראין אותו לול; והאבר נכנס לפנים מן הלול, בשעת גמר ביאה

Above the uterus and the vagina, between the uterus and the vagina, is the place in which the two ovaries are found, and the tubes along which the sperm from intercourse matures, this place is called the aliyah. (Maimonides, Mishneh Torah Issurie Bi'ah 5:4)

As we said, the problem is that the space which contains the ovaries is inside the abdomen, and this space does not connect with the vagina. It connects via the Fallopian tubes with the uterus.  Although Maimonides does not identify the aliyah as the ovaries themselves, some have done so. But the problem with this is that the ovaries don't bleed unless they develop a large cyst which then ruptures. But even in this case they bleed into the abdomen, or into the uterus, again via the Fallopian tubes, and not directly into the vagina.

Menachem ben Shalom (1249-1306) known as the Meiri, wrote an important commentary on the Talmud call Bet Habechirah - בית הבחירה and in it he too identifies the aliyah as the space between the uterus and the vagina in which the ovaries are found. He notes that in this space there are many blood vessels which may rupture and bleed directly into the vagina (עורקים שמתבקעים לפעמים), but as we have noted this is not biologically correct. Any bleeding from the adnexa is via the Fallopian tubes into the uterus itself, and certainly not directly into the vagina.

The Aliyah is the vagina

In his classic Biblisch-Talmudische Medezin published in 1911, Jacob Preuss identified the aliyah as the vagina. "It can be assumed with reasonable certainty" he wrote "that the cheder refers to the uterus, that the prosdor is the vulva, and that the aliyah is the vagina." However certain he may have been, Preuss is the only one to make this identification, which does not fit in with the text of the Mishanh. So let's try another suggestion.

The Aliyah is the Bladder

Sefer Ha'Arukh, Venice 1552.

Natan ben Yechiel of Rome, who died in 1106, wrote an influential lexicon of talmudic terms called the Sefer Ha'Arukh (ספר הערוך) which was first published around 1470. In that work the aliyah is identified as the urinary bladder. This identification also cannot be correct, because the bladder does not empty into the vagina, and because it does not lie between the uterus and the vagina but anterior to them. The commentary in the Schottenstein Talmud to Niddah 17b notes that a connection between the urethra and the vagina (known as a urethero-vaginal fistula) might account for bleeding from the bladder into the vagina. This is possible - though it is of course not normal anatomy.  

From here.

The AliyaH is a completely new structure

Meir ben Gedaliah of Lublin (d.1616) also considered the location of the aliyah in his modestly titled book Meir Einei Hakhamim - מאיר עיני חכמים - (Enlightening the Eyes of the Sages) first published in Venice in 1618.  He locates it between the uterus and the bladder, and provides two helpful schematics. The problem is that there is no such organ. You won't find it if you dissect a cadaver, and you won't find it in any textbook of anatomy (like this one). And as one astute radiologist and reader of Talmudology recently told me, you won't find it on an MRI either. Here is the text. 

Maharam Lublin. Meir Einei Hakhamim. Venice 1618. p255b.

This non-existent anatomy is also pictured in the Schottenstein Talmud (Niddah 17b), based on the difficult Mishanah.  

From Schottenstein Talmud Niddah 17b. Note that this does NOT correspond to the known female anatomy, but is a schematic based on Rashi's understanding.

The CHatam Sofer on the Aliyah

Moses Schreiber known as Chatam Sofer, (d. 1839) was a leader of Hungarian Jewry and he too weighed in on the issue in his talmudic commentary to Niddah (18a).

What is the "corridor" or the "room" or the "roof" or the "ground" or the "aliyah" ? After some investigation using books and authors experts and books about autopsies it is impossible to deny the facts that do not accord with the statements of Rashi or Tosafot or the diagrams of the Maharam of Lublin...but you will find the correct diagram in the book called Ma'asei Tuviah and in another book called Shvilei Emunah...therefore I have made no effort to explain the words of Rashi or Tosafot for they are incompatible with the facts...

Tuviah HaCohen, the Doctor from Padua

I couldn't find the diagram in any edition of the Shvilei Emunah to which the Chatam Sofer refers, so let's look at the diagram from Ma'asei Tuviah, which I happen to have in my own library.

Detail from Tuviah HaCohen, Ma'aseh Tuviah, Venice 1708. p132b.

A careful reading of the annotation (זז) reveals that Tuviah HaCohen (1652-1729) identifies the aliyah as that area containing the ovaries and the Fallopian tubes. In doing so he followed the opinion of Maimonides that we cited earlier, even though that does not in any way fit in with the understanding of Abaye and his ruling that blood found in the vagina that comes from the aliyah is not impure because it does not come from the uterus. Any gynecologist (or first year medical student completing their anatomy dissections) will tell you that blood from the adnexa (the ovaries and Fallopian tubes) can only get into the vagina via the uterus. But the most interesting part of this diagram is the very first line of text, at the top of the image. 

פירוש המחבר כפי ידיעת הנתוח  

The author's explanation according to knowledge gained from an autopsy

Anatomical Theatre, Palazzo del Bo, at the University of Padua. It was built in 1594 by the anatomist who helped found modern embryology, Girolamo Fabricius. From here.

Here, perhaps for the first time, anatomical knowledge from an autopsy is being shared in Hebrew. At the medical school in Padua, two bodies (one of each sex) had to be dissected each year, and all the students attended- Tuviah included.  As a medical student, Tuviah would have stood in the famous anatomical theater and watched the dissection, perhaps following along in one of the textbooks based on those dissections. 

Facts Matter

As the Chatam Sofer noted, facts matter. The illustration in the work of the Maharam of Lublin was an example of trying to get the facts to fit the text of the Mishnah (or more precisely, the explanations of Rashi and Tosafot) but in doing so the Maharam created a fictitious anatomical part.

It is very unlikely that the rabbis of the Talmud witnessed human dissections. In the ancient world two Greeks, Herophilus of Chalcedon and  Erasistratus of Ceos (who lived in the first half of the third century BCE) were "the first and last ancient scientists to perform dissections of human cadavers." Facts about human anatomy became clear once human dissection began in the fourteenth century, but as is demonstrated by the Maharam of Lublin, these lessons did not always diffuse into the Jewish community.  The Chatam Sofer is often - and rightly  - cited as a force for tradition against the challenges from the outside world. But the Hatam Sofer, at least in so far as gynecology was concerned, had no time for a theory when the facts show otherwise. In an age of "alternative facts" the Chatam Sofer is a model of rationalism.

Bava Basra 25b ~

The Sun's Orbit Around the Earth

בבא בתרא כה, א–ב

תניא ר"א אומר עולם לאכסדרה הוא דומה ורוח צפונית אינה מסובבת וכיון שהגיעה חמה אצל קרן מערבית צפונית נכפפת ועולה למעלה מן הרקיע ורבי יהושע אומר עולם לקובה הוא דומה ורוח צפונית מסובבת וכיון שחמה מגעת לקרן מערבית צפונית מקפת וחוזרת אחורי כיפה 

Rabbi Eliezer taught: The world is similar to a partially enclosed veranda [אכסדרה], [which is enclosed on three sides] and the northern side of the world is not enclosed with a partition like the other directions. When the reaches the northwestern corner it turns around and ascends throughout the night above the rakia [to the east side and does not pass the north side].

Rabbi Yehoshua says: The world is similar to a small tent [קובה], [and the north side is enclosed too,] and when the sun reaches the northwestern corner it orbits and passes behind the dome.

The monthly movement of the Earth, Moon, and Sun, according to Moses Hefez, Melekhet Mahashevet, Venice, 1710. From here

In this passage the path of the Sun is described, and to understand it you need to know this. The rabbis of the Talmud believed that the earth was a flat disc, and that above the sky was an opaque covering called the rakia. During the day the Sun was visible under the rakia, and then at night it zipped back from where it set in the west to where it would rise again in the east by traveling over the rakia. Something like this: 

From Judah Landa. Torah and Science. Ktav 1991. p66.

The other place that you will find the path of the Sun discussed in the Talmud is in Pesachim 94b.  Here is the text:

חכמי ישראל אומרים ביום חמה מהלכת למטה מן הרקיע ובלילה למעלה מן הרקיע וחכמי אומות העולם אומרים ביום חמה מהלכת למטה מן הרקיע ובלילה למטה מן הקרקע א"ר ונראין דבריהן מדברינו שביום מעינות צוננין ובלילה רותחין

The wise men of Israel say that during the day the Sun travels under the rakia, and at night it travels above the rakia. And Gentile wise men say: during the day the Sun travels under the rakia and at night under the Earth. Rabbi [Yehudah Hanasi] said: their view is more logical than ours for during the day springs are cold and at night they are warm.

From this is discussion it is once again apparent that in the talmudic view, the sky must be completely opaque. As the Sun passes over the top of the sky at night, it is not in the slightest way visible.

Also from Landa, p63.

It is hardly news to point out that a long time ago people believed that the universe was different to the way that we understand it to be today. But the belief of the rabbis of the Talmud was standard until only very recently, by which I mean only a few hundred years. 

Copernicus and his critics

When Nicolas Copernicus (d. 1543)  proposed his heliocentric universe he did so for a number of mathematical reasons but without any evidence. The experimental evidence that supported his claim did not appear for over three hundred years, when in 1838 the first measurement of stellar parallax occurred. Without evidence to support the Copernican model, many rejected it.  For example, the famous Danish astronomer Tycho Brahe (1546–1601) rejected the Copernican model, and came up with one of his own in which all the planets orbited the sun, which in turn dragged them around a stationary earth. For about one hundred years after Copernicus, the universities of Oxford and Cambridge ignored the heliocentric model entirely, and the English philosopher, statesman, and member of Parliament Francis Bacon (1561–1626) rejected the Copernican model as having “too many and great inconveniences.”

Galileo and the Catholic Church

Galileo published his discovery of the four satellites of Jupiter in Sidereus Nuncius in 1610. This discovery did not prove that Copernicus was correct, but it lent a great deal of corroborative evidence to the Copernican model. In addition Galileo noted that Venus seemed to change shape, just as the Moon did, sometimes appearing almost (but never quite) full, sometimes as a semi-circle, and at other times as sickle-shaped. The best explanation was that Venus was not orbiting the earth, but that it was in fact orbiting the Sun. And that turned out to be correct too. But as we know, things didn't tun out to well for Galileo. The Catholic Church, which by now had placed Copernicus' book on its Index of Banned Books, also banned Galileo's Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems - the book in which he outlined his proofs that the earth orbited the sun. The works of the astronomer Johannes Kepler (d.1630) were also added to the Index.  

The Jesuit Edition of Newton's Principa

In 1687 the Copernican model found support with the publication of Newton’s Principa Mathematica. In that work, Newton described the universal laws of gravitation and motion that were behind the observations of Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler.  The book went through three Latin editions in Newton’s life-time, and an English edition was published two years after his death in 1727.  A new three-volume edition of the Principia was published in Geneva between 1739 and 1742.  This edition contained a commentary on each of the book’s propositions by two Franciscan friars but was noteworthy for another reason. In its final volume, the “Jesuit edition”  contained a disclaimer by the friars distancing themselves from the heliocentric assumptions contained in the book:

Newton in this third book assumes the hypothesis of the motion of the Earth. The propositions of the author cannot be explained otherwise than by making the same hypothesis. Hence we have been obliged to put on a character not our own. But we profess obedience to the decrees promulgated by sovereign pontiffs against the motion of the Earth.

The Rabbis believed what everyone believed

So it wasn't just the rabbis of the Talmud who believed the earth stood still.  In fact they believed what (nearly) every one else continued to believe for at least a thousand years. The sun certainly looks like it revolved around the earth, so they created a model of the universe in which it did so, either by circling under the earth at night, or by zig-zagging back across the top of the rakia. Neither model turned out to be correct.  But in believing this, the rabbis were firmly in the majority.

[If you want more on this subject, Natan Slifkin has an excellent monograph on the Path of the Sun at Night. I'm also told there's an excellent book on the Jewish reception of Copernican thought.]

Talmudology on the Parsha, Balak: Animal Talk

במדבר 22: 28–30

וַיִּפְתַּח יְהֹוָה אֶת־פִּי הָאָתוֹן וַתֹּאמֶר לְבִלְעָם מֶה־עָשִׂיתִי לְךָ כִּי הִכִּיתַנִי זֶה שָׁלֹשׁ רְגָלִים׃ וַיֹּאמֶר בִּלְעָם לָאָתוֹן כִּי הִתְעַלַּלְתְּ בִּי לוּ יֶשׁ־חֶרֶב בְּיָדִי כִּי עַתָּה הֲרַגְתִּיךְ׃ וַתֹּאמֶר הָאָתוֹן אֶל־בִּלְעָם הֲלוֹא אָנֹכִי אֲתֹנְךָ אֲשֶׁר־רָכַבְתָּ עָלַי מֵעוֹדְךָ עַד־הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה הַהַסְכֵּן הִסְכַּנְתִּי לַעֲשׂוֹת לְךָ כֹּה וַיֹּאמֶר לֹא׃

Then the LORD opened the ass’s mouth, and she said to Balaam, “What have I done to you that you have beaten me these three times?” Balaam said to the ass, “You have made a mockery of me! If I had a sword with me, I’d kill you.” The ass said to Balaam, “Look, I am the ass that you have been riding all along until this day! Have I been in the habit of doing thus to you?” And he answered, “No.”

Once upon a time, we thought we were special. We were not animals. We were human beings, endowed with all kinds of qualities that animals did not and could not possess. We had free choice, and they acted as automatons. We had language, and they had meaningless grunting. We had a sense of justice, and they were savages. We could feel pain, and they could not.

The silly notion that animals do not feel pain is widely thought to have originated with the French philosopher Rene Descartes (1596-1650). "They eat without pleasure, cry without pain, grow without knowing it; they desire nothing, fear nothing, know nothing". While these words were those a student of Descartes, the contemporary philosopher Peter Harrison notes that they are generally thought to capture the essence of Descartes' view of animals. "The father of modern philosophy" continues Harrison, "is credited with the opinion that animals are non-sentient automata, an opinion for which over the centuries he has been ridiculed and vilified."

Once we stopped declaring and started exploring, it became clear that we were far more like the (other) animals than we had once thought. Yes, they felt pain (even fish, as we have described elsewhere). Of course as anyone who has owned a dog will know, they certainly display emotions: happiness, boredom and even guilt. The eminent primatologist Jan van Hoof visited Mama, a chimpanzee he had known for forty years, as she neared the end of her life. Weak and listless, watch her reaction as she slowly recognizes her old human friend. Animals don’t have emotions? What nonesense. (And by the way, pigs emotionally respond to music.)

““You are the very first man to talk like us. Oh, sometimes people annoy me dreadfully - such airs they put on, talking about ‘the dumb animals. ‘ Dumb! Huh! Why I knew a macaw once who could say ‘Good morning’ in seven different ways.” ”

— Polynesia, a West African parrot, from Dr. Doolittle by Hugh Lofting

But do animals use language? Of course they do.

The Sophisticated Language of Animal Communication

Animal communication, once thought to be simplistic and purely instinctual, has emerged as a field revealing profound complexities and sophisticated structures akin to human language.

Primates

Primates, our closest evolutionary relatives with whom we share about 99% of our DNA, exhibit some of the most intricate communication systems. Chimpanzees and bonobos use a combination of vocalizations, gestures, and facial expressions to convey information. Studies on chimpanzees have shown that their gestures are intentional and often goal-directed, and resemble the pragmatic use of gestures in human conversation. Bonobos use a variety of vocalizations to maintain social bonds and coordinate group activities, while vervet monkeys have specific alarm calls for different predators, such as leopards, eagles, and snakes. Each call triggers an appropriate escape response from other monkeys, demonstrating an understanding of what are called referential signals. This referential communication, akin to the use of words in human language, highlights the capacity for abstract representation and context-specific responses in animals.

Birds

Bird song is not just a series of beautiful sounds (though it is certainly that too). The syntax of bird songs, like for example the Bengalese finch, demonstrates structured sequences that follow specific rules, akin to the grammar in human languages. And these songs serve multiple purposes: attracting mates, defending territories, and even teaching young birds. And what about Alex, that really clever African Grey parrot you may recall having once heard about? A 2019 review with the delightful title Who’s a clever bird now? A brief history of parrot cognition published a couple of years summed up his language abilities:

Pepperberg and her students proceeded training Alex in the 1970s… Their studies on Alex spanned over three decades until his death in 2007 and produced some of the best results of human language experiments on animals: Alex learned over 100 words, could label and categorize unknown objects , developed concepts such as ‘same’ versus ‘different’, ‘bigger’ versus ‘smaller’, could count up to eight, add and subtract numbers and was learning Arabic numbers as well the alphabet.

Whales and Dolphins

Although you know this, it is worth saying that cetaceans, including dolphins and whales, exhibit remarkable communication abilities. Dolphins use a series of clicks, whistles, and body postures to convey detailed information about their environment and social structure. Each dolphin has a unique signature whistle that functions similarly to a human name, allowing individual recognition and social cohesion. Whales, like the humpback produce long, complex songs that can travel vast distances underwater. These songs exhibit hierarchical structures, with phrases and themes that can change over time, which suggests a form of cultural transmission and learning. And just a few months ago, there was a report in the prestigious journal Nature Communications which revealed that whales are using use a much richer set of sounds than previously known. The researchers called it the “sperm whale phonetic alphabet.”

Our results demonstrate that sperm whale vocalisations form a complex combinatorial communication system: the seemingly arbitrary inventory of coda types can be explained by combinations of rhythm, tempo, rubato, and ornamentation features. Sizable combinatorial vocalisation systems are exceedingly rare in nature; however, their use by sperm whales shows that they are not uniquely human, and can arise from dramatically different physiological, ecological, and social pressures.

“These findings also offer steps towards understanding how sperm whales transmit meaning...one of the key differentiators between human communication and all known animal communication systems is duality of patterning: a base set of individually meaningless elements that are sequenced to generate a very large space of meanings. The existence of a combinatorial coding system-at either the level of sounds, sound sequences, or both-is a prerequisite for duality of patterning. Our findings open up the possibility that sperm whale communication might provide our first example of that phenomenon in another species.
”

— Sharma, P., Gero, S., Payne, R. et al. Contextual and combinatorial structure in sperm whale vocalisations. Nat Commun 15, 3617 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-024-47221-8

The Dance Language of Bees

Even insects, often perceived as having limited cognitive abilities, demonstrate sophisticated communication methods. The waggle dance of honeybees is a prime example. This dance, performed by foraging bees, conveys precise information about the direction and distance of food sources relative to the hive. The dance language of bees is not only spatially accurate but also adaptable to environmental changes, showcasing a remarkable level of behavioral flexibility. (And, coincidentally, I have just finished reading this wonderful book on the discovery of that waggle dance by an assimilated German Jew named Karl von Frisch, who won the Nobel Prize for his work.)

But what about talking to the animals?

Balaam’s donkey did not just communicate with other donkeys. She also chatted with Balaam. So what do we know about cross-species communication? Well, as we mentioned, Alex the parrot could communicate with humans. Take a look at this clip and marvel at how we can talk to birds.

Let’s end with another picture worth a thousand words. Here is clip starring Washoe and Koko, two primates who were taught to use sign language - and who then created their own signs for words they had not been taught. Of course animals can talk. How silly to think otherwise.

And now, here is a topic for your Shabbat dinner conversation. Having read this post, do you agree with the late Rabbi Jonathan Sacks when he said this:?

““Biologically we may be part of the primate family, close cousins of the apes. Ecclesiastes, we recall, said as much: ‘Man has no pre-eminence over the animals.’ But humans remain unique. We are culture-producing animals. There are other social animals, but none that produce – except at the most rudimentary level – cultures, symbols, systems of meaning. It is this that gives us our unique adaptability. Other animals are genetically conditioned to act in certain ways under certain conditions. We have something more powerful than genetically encoded instinct. We are culture-producing, information-sharing, meaning-learning animals. Nature built us for culture. No animal painted the bonobo equivalent of the Sistine Chapel ceiling. No animal said, ‘To be or not to be.’ No animal philosophised that he or she might be nothing more than a hairy human. No animal was even an atheist, as far as I know. We may share many of our genes with the primates, as we do with fruit flies, bananas and yeast. The stones of an ancient cottage have mineral similarities to those out of which Chartres Cathedral was built. But there the resemblance ends.””

— Jonathan Sacks. The Great Partnership, Chapter 11, p. 200

Bava Basra 23b ~ Bizarre Talmudic Scenarios

This Post is for Bava Basra 23, the page of Talmud that we will study tomorrow, Thursday July 18th.

One hypothetical too many

Sometimes, the endless talmudic questioning can go too far. If a baby pigeon is found within 50 cubits of a coop, it is presumed to belong to the owner of that coop. If it is found further away than 50 cubits, it belongs to the finder. Ever keen to push the limits of rabbinic law, Rabbi Yirmiyah asked “if one foot of the pigeon is within the fifty cubits and one foot is outside, to whom does it belong?” This apparently was one question too many. The rabbis (rather unfairly in my opinion) expelled Rabbi Yirmiyah from the Yeshivah for asking it.

בבא בתרא כג, ב

בָּעֵי רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה רַגְלוֹ אַחַת בְּתוֹךְ חֲמִשִּׁים אַמָּה וְרַגְלוֹ אַחַת חוּץ מֵחֲמִשִּׁים אַמָּה מַהוּ וְעַל דָּא אַפְּקוּהוּ לְרַבִּי יִרְמְיָה מִבֵּי מִדְרְשָׁא

Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: If one leg of the chick was within fifty cubits of the dovecote, and one legwas beyond fifty cubits, what is the halakha? The Gemara comments: And it was for his question about this far-fetched scenario that they removed Rabbi Yirmeya from the study hall, as he was apparently wasting the Sages’ time.

Tomorrow’s bizarre case is one of many that we encounter as we make our way through the Babylonian Talmud. Consider this whopper, that we learned at the end of last year:

בבא קמא כז, א

 אָמַר רַבָּה: נָפַל מִן הַגָּג וְנִתְקַע — חַיָּיב בְּאַרְבָּעָה דְּבָרִים, וּבִיבִמְתּוֹ לֹא קָנָה. בְּנֵזֶק, בְּצַעַר, בְּשֶׁבֶת, בְּרִפּוּי. אֲבָל בּוֹשֶׁת לָא מִיחַיַּיב, דְּאָמַר מָר: אֵין חַיָּיב עַל הַבּוֹשֶׁת עַד שֶׁיִּתְכַּוֵּון

Rabba said: One who fell from a roof and was inserted into a woman due to the force of his fall is liable to pay four of the five types of indemnity that must be paid by one who damaged another, and if she is his yevama he has not acquired her in this manner. He is liable to pay for injury, pain, loss of livelihood, and medical costs. However, he is not liable to pay for the shame he caused her, as the Master said: One is not liable to pay for shame unless he intends to humiliate his victim…

As weird Talmudic cases go, this is among the weirdest. It is entirely impossible, and not least because this would happen. Did the rabbis of the Talmud really believe that such a case could occur? To answer this, let’s consider come other rather implausible cases from across the Babylonian Talmud.

 The AMAZING Shechita Knife

We begin with a fanciful question that is somewhat analogous to falling intercourse case. What happens if a person throws a knife across the room, but in doing so the flying knife somehow manages to cut the neck of an animal in just the correct fashion to perform a kosher shechita (ritual slaughter). Is the meat of this slaughtered animal kosher?

חולין לא, א

דתני אושעיא זעירא דמן חבריא זרק סכין לנועצה בכותל והלכה ושחטה כדרכה ר' נתן מכשיר וחכמים פוסלים הוא תני לה והוא אמר לה הלכה כר' נתן

Oshaya, the youngest of the company of Sages, taught a baraita: If one threw a knife to embed it in the wall and in the course of its flight the knife went and slaughtered an animal in its proper manner, Rabbi Natan deems the slaughter valid and the Rabbis deem the slaughter not valid. Oshaya teaches the baraita and he says about it: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan that there is no need for intent to perform a valid act of slaughter.

 The Fish That Pulled a Plough

The Bible (Deuteronomy 22:10) forbids a farmer to plough his land using an ox and a donkey together. While no reason for this law is given, we might suppose it has something to do with the concern that doing so might cause unnecessary pain to the smaller (or perhaps the larger?) animal. Regardless of the reason, later in our tractate the Talmud explains that this law applies to any kind of work and any two different species of animal. Then comes this fantastic question: “What is the law if someone pulls his wagon using a goat and a fish?” 

בבא קמא נה, א

בעי רחבה המנהיג בעיזא ושיבוטא מהו מי אמרינן כיון דעיזא לא נחית בים ושיבוטא לא סליק ליבשה לא כלום עביד או דלמא השתא מיהת קא מנהיג

The Sage Rachava raised a dilemma: With regard to one who drives a wagon on the seashore with a goat and a shibbuta, a certain species of fish, together, pulled by the goat on land and the fish at sea, what is the halakha? Has he violated the prohibition against performing labor with diverse kinds, in the same way that one does when plowing with an ox and a donkey together, or not?

This turned out to be such a hard question that the Talmud could not answer it. The Rosh concludes though that just to be sure, best not to hitch up your wagon to a fish, if you also intend for it to be pulled by a goat (ולא איפשיטא ואזלינן לחומרא). Don’t say you weren’t warned.

The Bird that built her nest on a person’s head

The Bible also demands that the mother bird must be shooed away before collecting the eggs upon which she is brooding. But what happens if a bird makes her nest in a person’s hair? Must this mother be driven away before her eggs are collected? (Chullin 139b)

חולין קלט, ב

אמרי ליה פפונאי לרב מתנה מצא קן בראשו של אדם מהו? אמר (שמואל ב טו, לב) ואדמה על ראשו

The residents of Pappunya said to Rav Mattana: If one found a nest on the head of a person, what is the halakha with regard to the mitzva of sending away the mother? Is the nest considered to be on the ground, such that one is obligated in the mitzva? Rav Mattana said to them that one is obligated in the mitzva in such a case because the verse states: “And earth upon his head” (II Samuel 15:32), rather than: Dirt upon his head, indicating that one’s head is considered like the ground. 

(And just to be clear - the Talmud is not discussing a case like this one, in which a woman allowed an abandoned fledgling to nest in her long har for 84 days, though it is, I will admit, a very touching story.) 

The Role of Bizarre cases

In a 2004 paper published in Thalia: Studies in Literary Humor, Hershey Friedman, a Professor of Business at Brooklyn College, suggested that “whether a situation is possible or not is immaterial when the Talmud is trying to establish legal principles.”  

Purely theoretical (at least in their days) cases are discussed because the sages felt that principles derived from these discussions would clarify the law and thus provide a more thorough understanding of it. Discussions of theoretical cases in the Talmud have allowed scholars of today to use the Talmudic logic and principles to solve current legal questions 

The theoretical questions make a legal point, and it is that legal point that is the real object of the discussion. Whether or not the case could actually happen is immaterial. Friedman also suggests that these unusual cases serve to keep the material interesting, and also act as brain teasers, which don’t necessarily make a legal point but serve to sharpen the minds of both the students and the teachers who ask them.

“There was a time, not many years ago, when a lawyer could feel reasonably confident as he approached oral argument in the United States
Supreme Court if he had thoroughly absorbed the record in his case and
had obtained a working knowledge of all relevant cases. No longer. Today, an advocate must, more than ever before, prepare himself for a
stream of hypothetical questions touching not only on his own case but on
a variety of unrelated facts and situations.”

— E. Barrett Prettyman Jr., The Supreme Court's Use of Hypothetical Questions at Oral Argument, 33 Cath. U. L. Rev. 555 (1984). 555.

 Hypothetical Cases in the US Legal System

It may help to understand the role that these weird cases have in the Talmud by understanding that hypothetical cases have an important role to play in many legal systems, including that of the United States. Consider this series of questions that were asked in the famous 1984 case of California vs Carney. Police officers entered a motor home without a search warrant, and found marijuana. The question before the court was whether this motor home was a more like a car, which should not require a search warrant, or more like a home, which would. There were various appeals, and the case ended up being heard in front of the US Supreme Court, which is where the following hypothetical questions were raised:

Q: Well, what if the vehicle is in one of these mobile home parks and hooked up to water and electricity but still has its wheels on?

Q: Suppose somebody drives a great big stretch Cadillac down and puts it in a parking lot, and pulls all the curtains around it, including the one over the windshield and around all the rest of them. Would that be a home?

Or how about this exchange back in 1982, (and the subject of which is once again a hot topic of debate in the US). In Board of Education v.Pico, the question before the Court was whether a public school board could remove books which it found to be objectionable from the shelves of junior and senior high school libraries, in order to promote the community's "moral, social, and political values." 

Q: Suppose they [the Board] barred the St. James version of the New Testament, and the Constitution of the United States, and the Declaration of Independence?

Q: Suppose some of these books were assigned as outside reading, and the children were told, you can get it in the public library?

Q. Suppose you had a book, counsel, that had been the subject of criminal proceedings, and conviction of someone in connection with that book had been sustained, a criminal conviction. Would you say that the book comes under this broad authority you suggest? 

(By the way, the Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, held that as centers for voluntary inquiry and the dissemination of information and ideas, school libraries enjoy a special affinity with the rights of free speech and press. Therefore, the School Board could not restrict the availability of books in its libraries simply because its members disagreed with their content. That might be useful to remember.)

There are many, many similar examples. Here is one of my favorites. It comes from United States v. Ross, in which the defendant’s lawyer argued that a small brown paper bag should not have been searched for narcotics because it was protected under the Fourth Ammendment, the right against unlawful search. Here is one of the hypotheticals:

Q: Suppose what they were hunting for was, say, a waffle iron, a stolen waffle iron, or something else that couldn't go in the paper bag. You might have probable cause to search the car for the waffle iron, but if you got to the paper bag, you wouldn't be searching it, would you?

Commenting on this case, the late American lawyer Elijah Barrett Prettyman Jr. (d. 2016) wrote that “one cannot help but be impressed with how far removed some hypotheticals are from the facts before the Court. In Ross, the brown paper bag case, one Justice had the police hunting for a waffle iron.”

Why we need Hypotheticals

Hypothetical cases are really important when the Supreme Court is trying to figure out the difficult cases that come before it. And they are all difficult cases, because if they were easy, the Supreme Court wouldn’t be considering them. The rabbis of the Talmud needed to do the same. This is why they often consider outlandish, implausible or downright fanciful cases to ponder, even if, as we read today, they sometimes got fed up with the never ending stream of hypotheticals.

The best way to think about these cases is to add in the following missing words: “Hypothetically, what would happen if…” Then, as if by magic, they cease to be silly and start to be really important.